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thus continues to leave definitions open, she also adds to the theories 
of others outlined in her work by providing her own analysis of the- 
ory, which m ay be in tu rn  used to further develop terms (towards 
definition?).
Thus Hollywood establishes complicated links between mysticism, his- 
tory, and gender. Because of the complexity of her argum ents this work 
is perfect for those looking for in-depth readings about French thinkers 
in relation to the developments in the study of mysticism and gender. 
For those looking for a general i^ ro d u c tio n  to mysticism, however, or 
for work that may provide a broad overview of mysticism and gender, 
this would not be appropriate. This study is ideal for those who already 
have basic knowledge of arguments in the area of French critical thought.
Hollywood seeks to redefine how we look at particular writings. In 
doing so, she presents us with traditional interpretations, while offering 
her analysis in opposition to those interpretations. This is helpful in 
putting her argum ents into context, as well as differentiating her schol- 
arship from previous studies. H er book is a m ust read for those inter- 
ested in studies of gender in relation to mysticism, especially in relation 
to contem porary French thinkers. She provides new readings of these 
thinkers, particularly of Bataille and Irigaray, and offers fresh insights 
into the writings pertaining to medieval female mystics. She provides 
an in-depth study that should lead others to new scholarship in this 
area.
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K e v i n  S c h ie b  r a c k
Famously, Fudwig W ittgenstein said that “ [p]hilosophy m ay in no way 
interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe 
it” (Philosophical Investigations [New York: M acmillan, 1953], p. 49). It 
seems, therefore, that his philosophy m ight provide the study of reli- 
gion with a healthy descriptivist methodology, an approach in which 
the observer’s own norms do not interfere with the description of reli-
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gion’s beliefs and practices. The problem  with this approach has been, 
however, that most of W ittgenstein’s philosophical followers who dis- 
cuss religion seem to operate with a fairly definite understanding of 
w hat religion “truly” is, and they consequently talk about religion in 
a very judgm ental way. If  their evaluative approach could be disen- 
tangled from W ittgenstein’s original project, the result would be valu- 
able for the study of religion generally. This book proposes this project 
but then disappoints as it recom m ends its own Christian theology and 
leaves the idea of a descriptivist m ethodology undeveloped.
Thom as argues that the W ittgensteinian approach makes the idea of 
selfrrenunciation cen tra l to its understan d in g  o f religion, and  the 
W ittgensteinians unpack this idea in terms of five elements. O n  this 
^ p ro a c h , then, religion is (1) pursued as an end in itself, not as a 
means to some other end; (2) it is not pursued for consolation; (3) it 
is unreflective; (4) it is a ^ rsp ec tiv e  or fmmework on life in general 
ra ther than  a belief about things in a r t ic u la r ;  and (5) it docs not 
involved the metaphysical, by which Thom as understands the super- 
natural. I would add that W ittgensteinians typically reject metaphysics 
not only in the sense of the supernatural, but also in the sense of claims 
about the nature of reality as such, that is, claims that are alleged to 
be necessary and so presupposed by any language game. But this five- 
part list docs capture the view of most W ittgemteinians.
Thom as praises the focus on self-renunriation, but he objects that 
understanding se lf-re^ncia tion  in terms of these five elements is prob- 
lematic. T he elements distort the study of religion because they lead 
one to classify as superstitious those forms of faith that are pursued as 
a means to a non-religious end, that are consoling or reflective, or that 
involve beliefs about particulars or a faith in the supernatural. T hom as’s 
strategy, one might say, is itself W ittgensteinian and therapeutic: it seeks 
to free W ittgensteinians from fois set o f assumptions. Thom as then pro- 
poses a different understanding of self-renunciaion, one he finds in the 
novels of the French Catholic writer Georges Bernanos. Bernanos sup- 
plies us with a superior sense of self-renunriation, Thom as believes, 
one in which consolation, reflection, and  the supernatural are not 
excluded.
Thom as then sketches the ،،roots” of the W ittgensteinian ^ p ro a c h . 
Thom as admits that at the literary and philosophical ideas he covers 
are not necessarily ones that W ittgenstein was exposed to directly, but 
they were in the cultural air and, Thom as holds, underlie his position. 
In  fois section Thom as produces often dizzying ^n n ec tio n s  of thinkers. 
In  the foreground are the ideas of Tolstoy, Trakl, Rilke, Hoffmansthal,
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and Emerson. K ant, Kraus, Dostoyevski, and Schopenhauer appear. 
“Some ^n n ec tio n s  of K ierkegaard will also he hrought in from time 
to time” (?2). O ne hrief and overhurdened paragraph links Hoffmansthal 
to Trakl to M ach to Ereud (73-4). In the end, Thom as concludes that 
W ittgenstein’s ‘،is a late nineteenth century world-view, heavily influenced 
hy a fin-de-siècle form of ]^ -ro m an tic ism , in which the self is infatu- 
ated with its own inner integrity and capacity to achieve an indepen- 
dence form all external contingencies” (99). This means for Thom as 
that ‘W ittgenstein is not a religions thinker in a Christian sense hecause 
of the ahsence in his life and thought of an unamhiguously Christian 
notion of se lf-re ]^ c ia tio n ” (106).
It is an interesting question w hat kind of religions faith or values 
W ittgenstein had  and T hom as’s interpretation is not implausihle. But 
sometimes the connections he points out are too suhtle for me to see. 
Eor example, it isn’t clear how an nti-consequentia list “capacity for 
detachm ent from dependence on outcom es” is “only a very short step 
from ” an n i - s u ^ r n a tu r a l  attitude in which one is unaffected hy “things 
ahove, heyond or hehind the w orld” (94).
Thom as is right that a philosopher’s writings can he read to reflect 
a concern for their own self-integrity, and perhaps none m ore than 
W ittgenstein’s. But w hat has becom e of the search for a descriptivist 
methodology? This book never defines the term , docs not show what 
W ittgenstein might have m eant by the idea, nor outlines such a method. 
It simply replaces one descriptive understanding of religion with another. 
T h a t se lf-re ]^ c ia tio n  is part o f the nature of religion is assumed, and 
the idea that “religion” is a family resemblance concept is not consid- 
ered. In  this light, a m ore apposite title for the book would have been 
Authentic Religious Virtue: Wittgenstein and Bernanos on Self-Renunciation.
As a last point, Thom as uses an unwieldy reference system in which 
he cites complete bibliographic f o r m a t io n  d ren th e tica lly  in the text 
about half the time and uses a system of codes the other half. The 
codes direct the reader to a key at the beginning of the book, and the 
key lets one tu rn  to the back of the book for complete bibliographic 
fo rm a tio n . This appn)aeh, coupled with the abundance of typographical 
and gram m atical errors, sentence fragments and repeated quotes, give 
the book an unpolished or even unfinished air. Better editing would 
have helped.
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